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COMMENTS
DONALDSON'S TROUBLESOME LEGACY:




The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the agency charged
with principal responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the
federal securities laws.' Its establishment was a reaction to the widespread
fraudulent selling of securities during the post-World War I decade, which
eventually helped trigger the stock market crash of 1929.2 Congress felt
that if a government agency could ensure "full and fair disclosure" of all
material facts concerning securities offered for public sale, it could prevent
the countless tragedies spurred by the crash of 1929 from reoccurring.3 As
a result, the SEC has been given broad enforcement authority by the stat-
1. The SEC is directed by five Commissioners (the Commission), no more than three
of whom may belong to the same political party. Members of the Commission are ap-
pointed to a five-year term by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 15
U.S.C. § 78d (1982).
The Commission is assisted by a staff of professionals made up of attorneys, accountants,
and securities analysts. Staff members are assigned to the four major divisions within the
SEC:
(a) Division of Corporation Finance-responsible for ensuring adherence to standards
of financial reporting and disclosure by companies under the jurisdiction of the various se-
curities laws administered by the SEC. Corporation Finance reviews registration state-
ments, prospectuses, periodic reports, and proxy statements in order to determine whether
there has been full and fair disclosure.
(b) Division of Investment Management-responsible for investigations and inspections
arising under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1982), and the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1982). See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying
text.
(c) Division of Market Regulation-responsible for conducting an ongoing surveillance
of the trading markets. This division plays a large role in the regulation of national securi-
ties exchanges and of brokers and dealers registered under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.
(d) Division of Enforcement-responsible for conducting all enforcement investigations
pursuant to federal securities laws.
2. 77 CONG. REC. 2910, 2911-14 (1933).
3. 77 CONG. REC. 2910, 2912-14 (1933).
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utes under its jurisdiction.4
Throughout most of its fifty-year history,' the SEC consistently has been
the subject of praise by both Congress and commentators for fairly and
responsibly wielding its substantial regulatory powers in the public inter-
est.6 Recently, however, there have been serious criticisms leveled at the
SEC, claiming that its enforcement process reflects a pattern of
overzealousness, and insensitivity to individual liberties and fundamental
concepts of fairness.7 These critics can take some solace in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Jerry T
O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC.8 The O'Brien court held that the SEC, for the first
time since its inception, must notify a target, or potential target, whenever
it issues a subpoena in connection with an investigation of the target. 9
Shortly thereafter, however, the same issue of notice to targets came before
the Southern District of New York in PepsiCo v. SEC.'° The court con-
cluded that a mandatory notice requirement would be devastating to SEC
investigations, and criticized the Ninth Circuit as being short-sighted.'"
The notice controversy can be attributed to the nature of SEC investiga-
tive subpoenas, and the limitations on the ability of investigative targets to
challenge their enforcement when issued to third parties. 2 In Donaldson v.
4. See infra notes 19-59 and accompanying text.
5. The SEC was created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d
(1982).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 1321, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980); "Report Card" on Federal
Agencies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 15, 1976, at 91.
7. Freedman & Sporkin, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement Pro-
gram.: A Debate on the Enforcement Process, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (1981); see Low-
enfels, Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations.- The Needfor Reform, 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 575, 579-81 (1971).
8. 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 697 (1984).
9. Id at 1069. The term "target" is not defined by SEC statute, rule, or practice. For
purposes of this Comment, a "target" is an individual or entity that has been formally or
informally identified as the subject of an SEC investigation. A "potential target" is an indi-
vidual or entity recognized as a possible subject, or in some cases, a temporary subject. For
example, the Commission may investigate unusually active trading in a particular stock
prior to an important press release by the issuing company. Anyone who traded in the
period prior to the release is a "potential target" of an insider trading investigation. In most
instances, the vast majority of traders will eventually be excluded as "potential targets" as
the investigation proceeds.
10. 563 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
11. Id at 832.
12. A formal investigation by the SEC almost inevitably requires the issuing of subpoe-
nas to nontargeted third parties. Often these parties have no interest in challenging the
subpoena, and simply comply as a matter of course. The target of the investigation, the
individual with the most to lose if the third party complies, has no standing to assert a
challenge. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. The target's only recourse is to per-
suade the third party to challenge the subpoena, and then attempt to intervene in the sub-
[Vol. 33:667
Donaldson's Troublesome Legacy
United States,' 3 the United States Supreme Court held that the subject of
an investigation might be able to intervene in a subpoena enforcement
proceeding if he could show a "significantly protectable interest."' 4 The
Court intimated, however, that even if such an interest were at stake, in
certain instances it is best to consider that interest after the investigation is
completed. 5
The issues of intervention and notice are intimately related. The
O'Brien court recognized that, as a practical matter, before a target can
attempt to intervene he must be notified that a subpoena has been issued.' 6
On the other hand, the PepsiCo court suggested that an SEC investigation
is one of those instances when protectable interests should be asserted after
the investigation has been completed and, therefore, there is no need for a
notice requirement.' 7
This Comment will address the notice issue in terms of the SEC's ulti-
mate objective of ensuring both investor protection and an individual's
recognized right to be investigated according to certain standards of fair-
ness. It will review various pertinent securities statutes, and the procedures
utilized to enforce them. Moreover it will discuss the various interests
which courts have recognized as bases for viable challenges to subpoena
enforcement, and an investigative target's right to intervene in a third-
party enforcement proceeding to assert those challenges. Finally, this
Comment will analyze the conflicting views which the courts have taken
on the notice issue, with emphasis on the advantages, disadvantages, and
policy considerations involved. It will conclude that the SEC's established
practice of denying targets notice of third-party subpoenas should be
preserved.
I. THE SECURITIES LAWS AND How THEY ARE ENFORCED: AN
OVERVIEW
A. Statutory Schemes and Purposes
Each of the statutes enforced by the SEC includes within its jurisdiction
numerous and varied individuals and entities taking an active role in the
securities industry. These congressionally enacted schemes were designed
to ensure the protection of investors, and secure the integrity of the
poena enforcement proceeding by asserting his own challenge. See infra notes 136-54 and
accompanying text.
13. 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (Internal Revenue Service investigation of taxpayer's returns).
14. Id at 531; see infra notes 141-54.
15. 400 U.S. at 531 (citing United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966)).
16. 704 F.2d at 1069.
17. 563 F. Supp. at 831.
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financial markets. 8 A discussion of these schemes and their purposes, as
well as the SEC's enforcement authority, is essential to the present inquiry
since the interests furthered by the securities laws ultimately will be bal-
anced against the individual rights to be protected by affording targets of
investigation notice of third-party subpoenas.
The Securities Act of 193319 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193420
were direct responses to the unethical practices of many individuals and
corporations selling securities at that time.2' In order to protect investors
from those practices, the 1933 Act requires that prospective purchasers be
apprised of all relevant material information concerning companies offer-
ing securities for public sale through the vehicle of interstate commerce.22
This is accomplished by requiring issuing companies both to register with
the SEC,2 3 and send potential purchasers a copy of an approved prospec-
tus. 24 The 1933 Act also contains antifraud provisions which impose per-
sonal liability upon specified individuals for false and misleading
statements contained in either a registration statement
25 or prospectus. 26
While the 1933 Act is designed to regulate the initial distribution of se-
curities, the 1934 Act focuses on the trading of securities in secondary mar-
kets through brokers and exchanges.27 It extends the requirements of
registration and disclosure to any company attempting to trade its securi-
ties over a national exchange, 28 thereby enabling prospective investors to
make an informed decision. The 1934 Act also protects investors in other
ways. Section 14(a), for example, makes it unlawful for any person to so-
licit a proxy or consent in violation of any rules or regulations established
by the SEC.29 The Act also continues the antifraud theme of the 1933 Act
18. 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (Message from the President to the Senate-Regulation
of Securities Issues, Mar. 29, 1933).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1982).
20. Id § 78a-78kk.
21. See supra note 18.
22. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1982). The SEC ensures only that the registration statement is
complete and accurate; it has no authority to evaluate the security's investment potential.
24. Id. § 77e(b)(2).
25. Id § 77k.
26. Id. § 77.
27. The legislation was prompted partly as a response to an investigation by the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, which revealed a myriad of unfair methods of specu-
lation being used by large operators to the detriment of the investing public. The Commit-
tee Report recognized that the security and prosperity of the entire country, and not just
individual investors, were intimately connected with the operation of the securities markets.
S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1932) (accompanying S. 3420, Apr. 20, 1932).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982).
29. Id § 78n(a).
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by prohibiting wash transactions, 30 matched orders,3I and other manipula-
tive and deceptive devices.32
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 193531 grew out of an in-
vestigation of the utility industry that revealed the existence of corrupt
practices on a national level.3 4 The regulatory scheme of the Act is aimed
toward the protection of both utility consumers and investors. 35  This
scheme makes it unlawful for electric and gas holding companies to en-
gage in interstate commerce without registering with the SEC. 36 Once reg-
istered, the holding company is subject to an examination of its structure
by the SEC, which may then take the steps necessary for simplifying or
eliminating existing complexities, and equitably distributing voting power
among shareholders. 37  The Act's ultimate goal is to create simplified
structures confined to a limited region, enabling efficient operation and
effective local regulation.38
In 1939, Congress promulgated the Trust Indenture Act,39 designed to
provide for independent trustees under indentures to protect the rights and
interests of individuals holding securities under those indentures.4° Under
the 1939 Act, a trust indenture, under which bonds, debentures and other
debt securities are offered for public sale, must be approved by the SEC.4 1
Additionally, the SEC assures that the appointed trustee will have the re-
30. A "wash transaction" occurs when there is an apparent sale of stock which actually
involved no change in beneficial ownership. Such transactions have the effect of creating a
misleading appearance of active trading in the stock. Id § 78i(a)(I).
31. A "matched order" occurs when an individual enters an order for the purchase or
sale of a security with the knowledge that a corresponding order for purchase or sale of
substantially the same size at approximately the same price has been or will be entered. Id
§ 78i(a)(2).
32. Id. § 78j(b).
33. Id. § 79a.
34. In its investigation, Congress discovered that electric and gas utility companies had
formed into top-heavy holding company structures which were grossly inefficient, and man-
aged by individuals more concerned with maneuvering for financial power than with pro-
viding a service to consumers. L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION, 132-33 (2d ed. 1961).
Many of the abuses which existed are recited in the Act, including the issuance of securi-
ties upon the basis of paper profits from intercompany transactions; subjecting subsidiaries
of the holding companies to excessive charges for services, construction work and equip-
ment; and floating securities for the purpose of purchasing operating utility companies,
rather than building or improving additional properties. 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (1982).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (1982).
36. Id § 79d.
37. Id. § 79k(a).
38. Id. § 79a(b)(5).
39. Id. § 77aaa-77bbbb.
40. Id. § 77bbb.
41. Id. § 77ggg.
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sources and intent necessary to safeguard the interests of investors.42
The Investment Company Act of 1940,43 like the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 44 was enacted to address the problems of a particu-
lar industry that could not adequately be met by the 1933 and 1934 Acts.45
It requires all investment companies using the mails or other vehicles of
interstate commerce to file a registration statement with the SEC. 6 Each
company must disclose its financial condition and investment policies to
provide investors with access to complete information.47
The Investment Advisors Act of 1940,48 passed contemporaneously with
the Investment Company Act,49 requires persons or firms in the business of
providing advice concerning securities investments to register with the
SEC.5 In their registration statements, investment advisors must disclose
all relevant and material information regarding their backgrounds and
business affairs, 5 ' in order to provide accurate and current information for
potential investors.
In 1970, Congress passed the Securities Investor Protection Act52 as an
amendment to the 1934 Act.53 The Act created the Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corporation (SIPC), a body comprised of brokers and dealers reg-
istered with the SEC, along with members of the national securities
exchanges.54 Each member of the non-profit SIPC must pay a fee which
then goes into a fund used to satisfy claims by investors for losses traceable
to the conduct or financial condition of a broker or dealer.55 The SIPC is
required to file financial statements and annual reports with the SEC,
5 6
In order to ensure the proper enforcement of the above statutes, Con-
gress provided the SEC with broad investigatory powers.5 7 The SEC has
the authority to use its own discretion in determining who and when to
42. Id § 77bbb.
43. Id. § 80a-1-64.
44. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
45. L. Loss, supra note 34, at 144.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1982).
47. Id
48. Id § 80b-!-21.
49. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 80-b-3 (1982).
51. Id. § 80-b-3(c)(1).
52. Id. §§ 78aaa- I 11. The Act was in response to the substantial losses suffered by in-
vestors due to the failure and financial difficulties of brokers and dealers. See Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
53. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2) (1982).
55. d. § 78ddd.
56. Id § 78ggg(c).
57. Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides in part:
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investigate. Most of the Acts also extend to the SEC the power to sue for
injunctions when violative conduct is uncovered 58 and, where appropriate,
to transmit evidence to the Attorney General for the purpose of criminal
proceedings.59
B. The Enforcement Process at a Glance
Maintaining investor confidence is one of the SEC's primary objectives,
and achievement of that end is tied to the effectiveness of its enforcement
program.6" The enforcement process is usually initiated by a lead coming
from one of many possible sources. One such source is investors who often
claim that they have been victims of securities violations.6' The SEC staff,
while reviewing registration statements, periodic reports, and other docu-
ments, often discover indications of violations. The SEC also operates a
market surveillance program, and has the authority to conduct on-site in-
spections of regulated entities such as broker-dealer firms.6 2 In addition,
leads are obtained from newspaper and other articles, as well as from in-
vestigations into related matters.
In view of its limited resources, the SEC must attempt to pursue those
cases which will have maximal impact. There are at least three factors
The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems
necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to
violate any provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder. . . . The
Commission is authorized in its discretion, to publish information concerning any
such violations, and to investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters which
it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of such provisions, in
the prescribing of rules and regulations under this chapter, or in securing informa-
tion to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation ....
15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982). The investigatory provisions of the other Acts resemble that of
the 1934 Act in breadth and tone. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(t), 79(r), 80a-41, 80b-9, 78ggg(c)(l)
(1982).
58. Id §§ 77t(b), 78u(d), 79r(f), 80a-41(e), 80b-9(e).
59. See, e.g., id. § 78u(d).
60. Enforcement is the largest activity at the SEC, accounting for approximately one-
third of the total budget. In 1982 the SEC brought 251 new enforcement cases, a 31% in-
crease over 1981 despite budgetary constraints and personnel reductions. J. Shad, Speech
Before the Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 21, 1983), reprinted in THE SEC SPEAKS IN
1983 21-23 (1983).
61. See, e.g., SEC v. Howatt, 525 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1975) (investigation initiated by a
written complaint from a broker whose clients had been victims of questionable securities
practices).
62. The Commission maintains a comprehensive program of oversight of the exchanges
and over-the-counter markets that includes surveillance; analysis and review of trading in all
markets; review and analysis of publications and filings; support for investigative matters;
and maintaining legal actions which result from market surveillance activities. E. HERLIHY
& T. FERRIGNO, AN OVERVIEW OF VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS IN SEC INVESTIGATIONS
AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, AN OUTLINE 11 (1980).
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taken into consideration when the SEC assesses enforcement priorities.
First, the SEC considers whether an alleged violation involves an institu-
tion or individual playing a strategic role in the securities industry.63 For
example, the SEC believes that if it can successfully induce broker-dealers,
banks and other professionals to perform properly, many violative activi-
ties can be prevented. Second, the SEC generally directs its programs at
abuses which recently have proliferated, and therefore have been
earmarked as high enforcement priorities.64 Third, individual cases in-
volving large sums of investors' dollars will draw the SEC's attention re-
gardless of the nature of the violations involved.65
Once priorities are established, the investigation begins. The SEC has
described the nature of its investigations as completely nonadversarial.66
They are similar to the activities of a grand jury in that their purpose is
solely one of fact-finding. Therefore the SEC's discretion in determining
who and when to investigate is not constrained by challenges based upon
forecasts of the probable result of the investigation.67
Generally, formal investigations are preceded by informal or prelimi-
nary inquiries. These inquiries are not conducted pursuant to subpoena
power 68 and, therefore, the SEC staff relies on the voluntary cooperation
of individuals with relevant information. The goal of the preliminary in-
vestigation is to determine whether it is likely that a violation of the securi-
ties laws has occurred.69 If such a likelihood exists, or if additional
leverage is required in order to conduct a proper inquiry, the staff will seek
a formal order of investigation from the Commission.7' This request is
usually made in the form of a memorandum stipulating the alleged viola-
tions, the relevant facts and circumstances, and the need for the formal
investigation. If the Commission agrees with the staffs recommendation,
it will issue the formal order. The formal order serves two important func-
tions: first, it draws the general boundaries of the investigation; and sec-
ond, it entrusts the staff with the power to issue subpoenas and administer
63. E. HERLIHY & T. FERRIGNO, supra note 62, at 2.
64. Id at 3.
65. Id
66. In re White, Weld & Co., I S.E.C. 574, 575 (1936).
67. Wooley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1938). The Rules Relating to Investi-
gations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-203.8 (1983), support the theory that the investigation is
nonadversarial, in that they provide few procedural protections for individuals being
investigated.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1983).
69. Id.
70. A formal finding by the staff of a likelihood of a violation is not a prerequisite to
issuance of a formal order. The SEC may also investigate facts and practices in order to
prescribe rules and regulations and recommend legislation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982).
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oaths.7 The order may also name the subjects of the investigation, if
known. The SEC, however, is not required to inform identified subjects
that they are being investigated.72 As a practical matter, subjects will usu-
ally become apprised of that fact as the investigation proceeds and subpoe-
nas are issued.
Unless the Commission orders otherwise, an investigation is nonpublic,
and all reports prepared pursuant to the investigation are for internal use
only.73 Confidentiality is critical since the mere existence of an inquiry
tends to undermine the reputation of the investigated company within the
investment community. 74 Nevertheless, at the conclusion of a deposition
or production of documents a subpoenaed third party will necessarily
leave with full knowledge of who the particular target is, and the SEC's
allegations against it.75 In an attempt to protect the reputation of the in-
vestigated party, the SEC has adopted the Wells Committee's7 6 suggestion
that all formal orders and letters accompanying subpoenas contain a state-
ment that the existence of an investigation does not necessarily mean that a
violation has occurred.77 The practical purpose of the statement is prophy-
lactic; it is designed to dissuade the subpoenaed party from making hasty
judgments concerning the culpability of the subject of the investigation.
Once the staff has exhausted its avenues of investigation, and has deter-
mined that there is sufficient evidence to prove its allegations, it will rec-
ommend to the Commission that formal enforcement proceedings be
brought.7" The SEC is given the authority to seek either temporary or
71. E. HERLIHY & T. FERRIGNO, supra note 62, at 27.
72. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1983).
73. Id § 202.5(a).
74. The SEC has been severely criticized for allowing adverse publicity to reach the
business community before there has been any determination that the law has been violated.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
75. See Lacy, Adverse Publicity and SEC Enforcement Procedure, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
435, 438-39 (1977). Witnesses called to testify in connection with the investigation are often
the sources of the damaging information. Frequently, they are competitors or former em-
ployees having no interest in maintaining the nonpublic posture of the investigation.
76. In 1972, the Commission appointed the Advisory Committee on Enforcement Poli-
cies and Practices for the purpose of evaluating and reviewing the SEC's overall enforce-
ment program, and making recommendations aimed at achieving fair and effective
procedures. The Committee consisted of John A. Wells, Manuel F. Cohen and Ralph H.
Demmler. REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES 1-3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WELLS
COMM. REP.].
77. See Merrifield, Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 Bus.
LAW. 1583, 1594 (1977).
78. The Wells Committee also suggested that when an investigation has reached the
point where the staff is going to the Commission to seek enforcement proceedings, prospec-
tive defendants should be notified of the charges against them, and afforded an opportunity
19841
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permanent injunctive relief under the various statutes which it adminis-
ters.79 In order to be successful in obtaining either type of relief before the
Commission, the staff need only show that it is warranted by the public
interest.8" Once in federal district court, the SEC must prove a reasonable
likelihood that the alleged violations will recur.8 ' Therefore, proving past
violations is insufficient; the SEC must prove a reasonable likelihood of
future violations.
Although the injunction is the only remedy authorized by most of the
securities laws, and because it is ineffective against "one time only" offend-
ers, the SEC has been able to secure various forms of ancillary relief in
recent years.82 These new sanctions have enabled the SEC to protect in-
vestors more effectively, and to assure future compliance with the securi-
ties laws.83 The forms of ancillary relief utilized by the SEC have included
disgorgement of proceeds received in connection with a public offering,84
to submit a written statement presenting their side of the facts and arguments. WELLS
COMM. REP., supra note 76, at 34. In some instances, a defendant might reveal facts justify-
ing the alleged unlawful conduct, or the staff may be persuaded to drop one or more of the
serious charges which would otherwise reach the ears of the business community. Letter
from A. Mathews to the SEC Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices
(May 23, 1972), reprinted in Mathews, A.L.I Proposed Federal Securities Code: Part XV-
Administration and Enforcement, 30 VAND. L. REV. 465, 485-86 n. 124 (1977). Despite these
advantages, the Commission refused to formally adopt the "Wells Submission" procedure.
Instead these advantages would be attained on a "strictly informal basis in accordance with
procedures which are now generally in effect." Procedures Relating to the Commencement of
Enforcement Proceedings and Termination of Staff Investigations, Securities Act Release No.
5310 (Sept. 27, 1972) [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,010 (SEC
1972).
In practice, the staff decides whether to afford a prospective defendant notice and an op-
portunity to present its case to the Commission. Although the staff has been criticized in the
past for exercising its discretion inconsistently and arbitrarily, the staff will now, upon re-
quest, usually grant a prospective defendant the opportunity to make a Wells submission.
79. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d), 79r(f), 80b-9(e) (1982).
80. See, e.g., id § 78u(d).
81. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 924 (1973) (in order for the SEC to obtain injunctive relief, there must be a showing
that the person charged is engaged, or intends to engage, in conduct constituting a violation).
82. See Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1779, 1779-82 (1976); Hazen, Administrative Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission 's Use of Injunctive and Other Enforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 444-
51 (1979).
83. Authority for these remedies has been founded on the equitable powers of federal
courts in adjusting their remedies in order to grant the necessary relief where federally se-
cured rights are invaded. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir.
1972) (ancillary relief which included appointment of a trustee to receive defrauded lands
and distribute them to defrauded investors; a temporary freeze on the accused's assets; and





impoundment of assets in order to satisfy likely future judgments against a
defendant,8 5 and appointment of a receiver to preserve and protect prop-
erty that was the subject of pending litigation.
8 6
The effectiveness of these and other types of ancillary relief, as well as
that of the SEC enforcement process generally, depends to a large extent
on the ability of the staff to exercise its subpoena authority pursuant to the
formal order of investigation. The subpoena is the staff's principal tool for
gathering information," which in turn provides leverage for the SEC in
dealing with prospective defendants.
There are two general requirements which govern the form of an SEC
subpoena. First, the number of documents sought through a subpoena du-
ces tecum must not be unnecessarily burdensome.8 8 Second, the informa-
tion sought must be relevant to the purpose of the investigation as
described in the formal order.89 These two requirements, though logically
distinguishable, are often meshed by courts to form a standard of reason-
ableness.9" The staff need not make any showing of probable cause that a
violation has occurred,91 nor must it show that the subject of the investiga-
tion is within the jurisdiction of the securities laws.92 The absence of such
restrictions on the issuance of a subpoena reflects its critical importance to
the SEC as a tool for regulating the securities industry.
85. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 932 (1974) (enjoining the dispostion of a large share of defendant's stock held to be
within the district court judge's discretion where the stock would be a critical asset should
the plaintiff prevail on the merits).
86. See SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), at'd,
435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970) (because the defendant corporation's management team worked
so closely together, a wholly disinterested officer of the court was chosen to administer the
corporation and prosecute certain of the members of the management team).
87. The subpoena may take two forms: ad testificandum, which requires the subject of
the subpoena to appear for a deposition, or duces tecum, which requires the production of
stipulated categories of documents. See generally Merrifield, supra note 77, at 1604-05.
88. See SEC v. Blackfoot Bituminous, Inc., 622 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1980) (a sub-
poenaed party challenging enforcement on grounds that the subpoena is unnecessarily bur-
densome carries the burden of proving that allegation).
89. See SEC v. Howatt, 525 F.2d 226, 229 (1st Cir. 1975) (information sought via a
subpoena found to be relevant where the subpoenaed party offered no meaningful evidence
of abuse by the staff).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950) (quoting
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946)).
91. See SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1053-54 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974) ("official curiosity" held sufficient for enforcement of an
SEC subpoena).
92. See SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1375 (2d Cir.), cer. denied,
398 U.S. 958 (1970) (the initial determination of whether a particular person or entity is
covered by the securities laws lies within the discretion of the Commission).
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II. CHALLENGING SUBPOENA ENFORCEMENT
Although both Congress and the courts have given the staff much discre-
tion in the issuance of subpoenas, there is one significant constraint on its
information gathering power. SEC subpoenas, like administrative subpoe-
nas generally, are not self-executing;93 therefore, a witness has a right to
refuse compliance with the subpoena without threat of contempt proceed-
ings. The SEC must then petition the appropriate federal district court for
an order compelling the witness to comply.94
Whether compliance should be ordered is the issue addressed at the sub-
poena enforcement proceeding. The witness usually challenges the sub-
poena on one or more grounds, ranging from procedural flaws in its
issuance, to the violation of a constitutional right if it is enforced. Al-
though in most instances the court orders the witness to comply, the sub-
poena enforcement proceeding does safeguard against abuse of individual
rights by an overly zealous staff.
The challenges recognized by the courts have developed within the con-
text of subpoenas issued to individuals who are also the targets of investi-
gation. Difficulties arise, however, when a subpoenaed third party
attempts to challenge subpoena enforcement by asserting rights that only
the investigative target has standing to raise,95 and when a target attempts
to challenge a subpoena issued to a third party. The latter situation com-
pels a confrontation with the issues of notice and intervention. Initially,
however, the development of substantive and procedural challenges to
subpoena enforcement must be reviewed.
A. Challenges Available to Subpoenaed Targets and Subpoenaed Third
Parties
A subpoenaed party may challenge an SEC subpoena on any appropri-
ate ground,9 6 but those who have based their challenges on either a flaw in
subpoena form or a lack of jurisdiction of the SEC have not had much
success. In SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributing Co., 97 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the SEC did not have to
show that the subject of the investigation was within its regulatory author-
ity before a subpoena could issue. Furthermore, the court stated that rais-
93. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(b) (1982).
95. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) (party seeking review
of agency action must in fact be among those injured by the action).
96. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. at 446.
97. 480 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
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ing jurisdictional issues was improper at the subpoena enforcement stage
since the SEC must have free reign to investigate whether, in fact, the ac-
tivities in question are within its regulatory authority.98 The court made
clear that the proper time for adjudicating such issues is at the trial stage.99
Challenges to the form of a subpoena, i.e., that it is burdensome, or that
it seeks irrelevant documents, are usually dismissed by courts without
elaboration."° This is because the formal order of investigation is written
in general terms, rendering most documents in the possession of the party
relevant. In addition, a subpoena that seeks production of a veritable
mountain of documents will not be considered burdensome as long as each
of the documents is relevant to the investigation.' 0 ' As a result, the rea-
sonableness of a SEC subpoena is usually sustained.
A subpoenaed target or third party may also mount a challenge claiming
that the SEC, in issuing the subpoena, failed to fulfill the requirements
established in United States v. Powell.'0 2 In Powell, a case arising in the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) context, the United States Supreme Court
enunciated the showing that the IRS must make for one of its subpoenas to
be procedurally sound. Powell, the subject of the investigation, refused to
comply with the subpoena contending that the IRS had to prove a reason-
able basis for believing a fraud had been committed." 3 The Court dis-
agreed, stating that the IRS did not have to meet any standard of probable
cause in order to enforce a subpoena. Instead, the Court held that the IRS
must show that: (1) the investigation is being conducted pursuant to a
legitimate, congressionally authorized purpose; (2) the particular inquiry is
relevant to that purpose; (3) the information is not already in the Commis-
sioner's possession; and (4) the administrative steps required by the Inter-
nal Revenue Code have been followed." °
Elaborating on its authority to question the motivation for an IRS inves-
tigation, the Powell Court invoked the equitable power courts have to pre-
vent abuse of their process. The Court concluded that such an abuse
98. 480 F.2d at 1053.
99. The Court emphasized the need for the Commission to investigate without undue
interference or delay. Id
100. See, e.g., SEC v. ESM Gov't. Sec., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 311 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981) (where
contention that subpoena exceeded scope of SEC investigation was rejected by the lower
court and not appealed, the contention is treated as abandoned).
101. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1071 (1979) (subpoena requiring production of documents which, when stacked,
would extend 275 lineal feet, and cost the subpoenaed party over $100,000, determined not
to be unduly burdensome).
102. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
103. Id at 49.
104. Id at 57-58.
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results when a court enforces a summons issued pursuant to an unauthor-
ized purpose or an investigation conducted in bad faith.' °5
Although Powell represents the definitive statement with regard to the
appropriate issues for review in an IRS subpoena enforcement proceeding,
it is unclear whether review in the SEC context is as extensive. In SEC v.
Blackfoot Bituminous, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit inferred that the third procedural requirement which must
be met by the IRS, showing that the information sought is not already in
its possession, may not be applicable to the SEC.1" 6 The court placed the
burden on the challenging party to identify the items allegedly in the stafis
possession. 10 7 Since the challenging party failed to do so, the SEC was
apparently under no obligation to fulfill this Powell requirement.
The remaining Powell requirements, however, have consistently been
applied to SEC investigative subpoenas. ' 8 In fact, challenges to subpoena
enforcement charging an improper purpose for either the entire investiga-
tion or the issuance of a particular subpoena, though largely unsuccessful,
are somewhat common. Technically, the formal order of investigation is
issued pursuant to an authorized purpose, such as, investigating possible
violations of stipulated provisions of the securities acts. The staff, as a
practical matter, would never state that it is issuing a subpoena to harass or
pressure an individual, even if that is its intention. Likewise, an investi-
gated party will, in an attempt to delay the inquiry, allege that the SEC has
ulterior motives for its investigation that are not authorized by statute.
In general, the burden lies with the target to prove that the investigation
is not being conducted pursuant to the stipulated legitimate purpose. 0 9 A
number of circuits, however, have allowed a subpoenaed party an eviden-
tiary hearing to inquire further into the motives of the agency that issued
105. Id. at 58.
106. 622 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1980).
107. Id. at 515.
108. Another notable difference in the showings required of the IRS and SEC lies in the
administrative steps mandated by the agencies' respective governing statutes. An SEC for-
mal order of investigation is the only administrative requirement necessary for issuance of
an investigative subpoena. 17 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1983). The steps required for issuance of an
IRS subpoena, however, are more numerous and complex. For example, § 7609(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (1982), the provision in dispute in Powell, re-
quires the taxpayer to be notified in writing as to why a second inspection of relevant books
of account is necessary. In addition, there are restrictions concerning the time and place for
review of documents, Id § 7605(a), and requirements for notifying targets of investigation
when certain third parties are issued subpoenas. Id § 7609.
109. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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the subpoena or summons. The Courts have required that the individual
initially muster some evidence to support its improper purpose allega-
tion." The purpose of the evidentiary hearing is to identify those rare
cases in which bald allegations of improper purpose can be substanti-
ated."' After such a hearing, the court has the discretion to order addi-
tional discovery procedures to ferret out any improper motivations. If
such motivations exist, the court will deny enforcement of the subpoena."
2
. Ayers v. SEC"3 involved such a scenario. Ayers sought to stay an SEC
investigation which had numerous subpoenas outstanding. He alleged that
the SEC's purpose in issuing the subpoenas was to harass Ayers and his
associates, because they had successfully defeated an injunctive action the
SEC had brought against them in another matter. The Montana District
Court granted Ayers' motion to stay. The court held that he had raised
sufficient doubts concerning SEC motives to merit a limited evidentiary
hearing to decide whether discovery was warranted to determine the SEC's
purposes." 4 Ayers stands for the proposition that courts, given the proper
circumstances, will not simply defer to the discretion of the agency, but
will inquire into its motives.
A related problem that has continually burdened courts is the existence
of parallel civil and criminal proceedings. In general, when there is an
imminent or pending criminal charge against an individual also the subject
of a civil investigation arising out of the same circumstances, there is an
inherent danger that the fruits of civil discovery will be used to further the
criminal investigation. As a result, subpoenaed parties who are targets of
investigation have alleged, as a challenge to enforcement, that issuance
was made s olely for the unauthorized purpose of fueling a parallel crimi-
nal proceeding." 5 A series of United States Supreme Court cases culmi-
110. See United States v. Cortese, 614 F.2d 914, 921 n.12 (3d Cir. 1980) (in order for a
taxpayer to demonstrate the improper investigative motives, he must be afforded basic dis-
covery tailored to the inquiry); United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824
(9th Cir. 1975) (a subpoenaed party must show some evidence of improper motive before
discovery will be ordered; an evidentiary hearing consisting of an examination of the agent
who issued the summons would be the proper method for determining whether to proceed
with discovery); United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1970) (where, after an
evidentiary hearing, there remains a substantial question in the court's mind regarding the
,government's purpose, it may then grant discovery).
111. United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d at 825. The form of the proposed
evidentiary hearing consisted of an examination of the staff member who issued the sub-
poena by the subpoenaed party. The court, after observing the examination, determines
whether discovery is in order. Salter, 432 F.2d at 700.
112. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58.
113. 482 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. Mont. 1980).
114. Id. at 753.
115. See, e.g., United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); Donaldson v.
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nating in United States v. LaSalle National Bank," 6 discussed the
enforceability of IRS civil investigative subpoenas in light of an existing
criminal investigation. 1 7 The LaSalle Court held that the mere potential
for criminal prosecution was insufficient to defeat enforcement of a civil
subpoena. Such subpoenas would be denied enforcement only if they were
issued subsequent to the IRS's referral of the case to the Justice Depart-
ment for criminal prosecution.
1 8
Whether LaSalle applies to parallel investigations into possible viola-
tions of the securities laws was the issue addressed in SEC. v. Dresser In-
dustries, Inc. 119 That issue arose in the context of the SEC's campaign
against the improper use of corporate funds to influence government offi-
cials in the United States and foreign countries. 120 As part of its cam-
paign, the SEC instituted a "Voluntary Disclosure Program" to encourage
corporations to pursue investigations of their past conduct and make ap-
propriate disclosures, with only a remote chance of enduring an enforce-
ment action.1 2 1 Dresser participated in this program, but after filing three
Form 8-K's, 22 was requested to release to the SEC the documents forming
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1969); SEC v.
Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980).
116. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1969). The Kordel Court held that
parallel proceedings are not per se unconstitutional. Implicit in its analysis was the overrid-
ing importance of prompt investigation on both fronts in order to protect the public interest.
The Court did state, however, that it may be unconstitutional for the government to initiate
a civil investigation solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence to further a criminal investi-
gation. Id at 11-12. This latter proposition was reiterated by the Court in Donaldson, 400
U.S. at 533.
118. 437 U.S. at 313-17.
119. 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980).
120. In Dresser, the court noted:
SEC investigation revealed that many corporate officials were falsifying financial
records to shield questionable foreign and domestic payments from exposure to the
public and even, in many cases, to corporate directors and accountants. Since the
completeness and accuracy of corporate financial reporting is the cornerstone of
federal regulation of the securities markets, such falsification became a matter of
grave concern to the SEC.
628 F.2d at 1371.
121. Id The program consisted of four basic elements: (1) a thorough investigation by
an independent committee of the corporation into questionable foreign payments by the
corporation; (2) disclosure of the results of the investigation to the board of directors; (3)
disclosure of the substance of the report to the SEC on Form 8-K, without including specific
names, places, or dates; and (4) issuance of a policy statement by the corporation prohibiting
such payments in the future. Id
122. Id at 1372. Form 8-K is a current report which must be filed by companies regis-
tered under the 1934 Act upon the occurrence of any of a number of events enumerated on
the form, including changes in control and acquisition or disposition of assets.
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the basis of the reports. When Dresser refused, the Commission ordered a
formal investigation and subpoenas were issued. Concurrently, the Justice
Department began a criminal investigation, and requested from the SEC
its files on Dresser, including the 8-K's. Dresser sought to quash the SEC's
subpoenas, claiming that transferring the files to Justice was a "referral"
under LaSalle, and therefore the civil investigation should be stayed.
1 23
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
refused to extend the LaSalle restrictions to the SEC investigative pow-
ers. 124 After an extensive review of the Internal Revenue Code and the
various securities statutes, the Dresser court held that the SEC investiga-
tive power was authorized to continue during a parallel criminal investiga-
tion until the latter results in an indictment. It cited a key distinction
between the respective nature of the two agencies' investigations: the IRS
can postpone tax collection without serious harm to the public; the SEC,
however, must investigate quickly and effectively before false or incom-
plete statements, or fraudulent conduct in general, infects the financial
markets. 25 The court, however, did approve the application of LaSalle to
SEC investigations to the extent that the SEC, like the IRS, must not issue
a civil subpoena for the sole purpose of obtaining criminal evidence.'
26
Subpoenaed parties have also had some success in challenging enforce-
ment based on Powell's prohibition of abuse of process. Such an abuse
occurs when a court enforces a subpoena issued for an unauthorized pur-
pose or pursuant to an investigation which the agency has conducted in
bad faith.' 27 Therefore, a subpoena issued pursuant to an investigation
conducted for an authorized purpose may nevertheless be denied enforce-
ment on abuse of process grounds if the subpoenaed party can successfully
prove "bad faith" on the part of the SEC.
In SEC v. ESM Government Securities, Inc. ,I28 the subpoenaed party
challenged enforcement alleging that the SEC had engaged in fraud and
deceit during its investigation. The party maintained that for a court to
123. Id at 1370.
124. Id at 1380.
125. Id at 1379-80; see infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
126. 628 F.2d at 1387.
127. Powell's "abuse of process" language reads:
Nor does our reading of the statement mean that under no circumstances may
the court inquire into the underlying reasons for the examination. It is the court's
process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court may
not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take place if the sum-
mons had been issued for an improper purpose . . . or for any other purpose re-
flecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.
379 U.S at 58.
128. 645 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
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enforce a subpoena based on information obtained as a result of such con-
duct is an abuse of process. Like the Powell Court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invoked the equitable power it had
over its own process to prevent abuse, oppression and injustice, and held
that fraud, deceit or trickery is grounds for denying enforcement of an
administrative subpoena.' 29 In so doing, the court illustrated its authority
to consider the staffs methods and its underlying motivation for con-
ducting an investigation.
Other successful challenges to enforcement asserted by subpoenaed
targets of investigation have been based upon the first,'
3
1 fourth, 31
fifth,' 3 2 and sixth1 33 amendments. In general, however, courts have taken
129. Id at 317.
130. See, e.g., SEC v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981),
where McGoff, a newspaper publisher, challenged an SEC subpoena on grounds that the
information sought could include documentation regarding editorial decisions on the
sources for, or writing of, news stories. The District of Columbia Circuit modified the sub-
poena to permit the withholding or deletion of documents, or segregable portions of docu-
ments, relating solely to editorial policy or newsgathering. The decision represents an
attempt by courts to weigh and accommodate competing, significant interests. But see, SEC
v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1380 (2d Cir. 1970) (the fact that a demand for
disclosure may have some deterrent effect upon freedom of speech does not automatically
invalidate it).
131. Since the SEC is not required to make a showing of probable cause when it issues a
subpoena, an individual does not have that particular fourth amendment challenge avail-
able. Nevertheless, the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does apply. Therefore, an SEC subpoena can be attacked for being overly broad, see
supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text, or for not describing with reasonable certainty
the category of documents sought. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
at 208-09 (the fourth amendment, if applicable at all to a subpoena seeking production of
corporate records, only requires that the subpoena's description of documents to be pro-
duced not be too indefinite). In these instances, however, a court is more likely to allow the
staff to narrow its demand, or describe it with more certainty, than to bar enforcement com-
pletely.
Under certain circumstances, a corporation may have a fourth amendment privilege, but
an officer, employee or third person may not plead it personally to suppress corporate books
and records implicating them. Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 858 (1947).
132. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked by an in-
dividual to challenge subpoena enforcement, SEC v. Yanowitch, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,533 (D.C. Cir. 1974), but the privilege is not available
to a corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Therefore, a subpoenaed party may
not withhold corporate records on the ground that production would tend to incriminate
him personally, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), nor on the ground that produc-
tion would tend to incriminate the corporation, United States v. Fago, 319 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.
1963).
The privilege is personal, and therefore it applies solely to personal testimony or records
in the subpoenaed party's possession. The latter, however, will be protected by the privilege
only if they were prepared by the subpoenaed party. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1975). If, for example, the SEC subpoenaed a broker's accounting records which, although
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an extremely narrow view of the amendments' protections and have sided
instead with the legitimate interests of society in enforcement of its laws.
Common law privileges, such as attorney-client 34 and attorney work
product, 35 also have been asserted successfully, but they too have been
narrowly construed.
B. A Target's Ability to Challenge Enforcement of a Third Party
Subpoena
The Powell and other challenges assume a more narrow meaning when
the individual subpoenaed by the SEC is not the subject of the investiga-
tion. A witness called to testify or produce documents often has no interest
in challenging the subpoena. The subject of the investigation, the individ-
ual most concerned with the information sought, has no standing to bring
a challenge.' 36 In order to protect its rights in such a situation, an investi-
gative target must either attempt to restrain compliance, or persuade the
subpoenaed party to challenge, and then attempt to intervene in the en-
forcement proceedings.
A target's ability to intervene in a third-party enforcement proceeding
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Reisman v. Cap/in,137 a case aris-
ing within the context of an IRS investigation. In Reisman, two taxpayers
brought an action to enjoin their accountants from complying with an IRS
summons issued pursuant to an investigation into the taxpayers' tax liabil-
in his possession, were prepared by his accountant, those records will not be protected unless
the broker is compelled to affirm the truth of their contents. 425 U.S. at 409.
133. Any person compelled to appear at an investigation has the right to be accompa-
nied, represented and advised by counsel. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7 (1983); see SEC v. Higashi, 359
F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1966).
134. The attorney-client privilege, available as a ground for challenging SEC subpoena
enforcement, is based on the premise that sound legal advice is in the public interest and
such advice depends upon the attorney being fully informed by the client. Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). By protecting their communications from discov-
ery, the privilege serves to encourage full and frank communication between attorney and
client. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403. The privilege has traditionally been read as narrowly as
possible, however, and therefore a strict standard of waiver applies; any loss of confidential-
ity through disclosure, even if inadvertent, destroys the privilege. Tasby v. United States,
504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125 (1975). The attorney-client
privilege takes on additional meaning in the context of the securities laws, where complete
disclosure of material information is required. See generally Hooker, Lawyers'Responses to
Audit Inquiries and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 Bus. LAW. 1021 (1980).
135. The attorney work product privilege creates a zone of privacy in which an attorney
can investigate, analyze and prepare a case. Work product includes, among other things,
any materials which reflect an attorney's preparation of legal theories, strategy, or mental
impressions. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
136. Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1937).
137. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
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ity.13 The Supreme Court dismissed the action holding that the taxpayers
had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a summons enforcement
proceeding. 39 The Court clearly stated that a target could intervene in a
third party summons enforcement proceeding to protect any personal in-
terests at stake.'4
This apparent absolute right to intervene was severely limited eight
years later in Donaldson v. United States.'4' As part of its investigation of
Donaldson's tax liability, the IRS issued subpoenas to third parties, includ-
ing his employer. Donaldson secured an order temporarily restraining co-
operation by the third parties, and the IRS brought an action to enforce
compliance. Donaldson attempted to intervene in the enforcement pro-
ceeding as a matter of right to assert his personal objections to enforce-
ment. Both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit denied intervention. 142 The Supreme Court affirmed.
43
The Court stated that an individual does not have an absolute right to
intervene in a third-party enforcement proceeding merely on the basis of
his status as the target of the investigation.' 44 Instead, the right to inter-
vene is permissive; it is conditioned upon the target's showing that a "sig-
nificantly protectable interest" is at stake.'
4 5
According to the Donaldson Court, a significantly protectable interest is
one which could be asserted by the target at a subsequent trial to suppress
the information, regardless of how the IRS obtained it from the third
party. 146 The Court cited as examples abuse of process and attorney-client
privilege. 147 It stated that if a "significantly protectable interest" were in-
volved, a subsequent trial may indeed be the proper place for it to be as-
serted and protected.44 The judge must balance the opposing equities to
determine whether to allow the challenge at the subpoena enforcement
138. Id at 441.
139. Id at 443.
140. Id at 449.
141. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
142. 418 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1969).
143 400 U.S. at 517.
144. Id at 530.
145, Id. at 531.
146. The Donaldson court noted:
The nature of the "interest" urged by the taxpayer is apparent from the fact that
the material in question . . . would not be subject to suppression if the Govern-
ment obtained it by other routine means. . . . This interest cannot be the kind
contemplated by Rule 24(a)(2) . . . . What is obviously meant there is a signifi-
cantly protectable interest.
400 U.S. at 531.
147. Id





The Donaldson formula has been the law with regard to intervention in
third-party subpoena enforcement proceedings for over a decade. During
that period, lower courts have had difficulty agreeing upon an interpreta-
tion of the decision. Despite Donaldson, some courts have equated the
ability to intervene with due process rights,'5 ° traditionally inapplicable in
nonadversarial settings.'"' Other courts have avoided the issue by holding
that the interest asserted was not significantly protectable. 2 Still others
have read Donaldson as vitiating the right to even permissive intervention,
on the ground that an investigation should never be hampered by an indi-
vidual capable of protecting his interests if and when the case reaches the
trial stage. 153
The dispute over the Donaldson intervention rule, though limited for the
most part to IRS investigations, now has spread to the SEC enforcement
process. To appreciate the issues currently plaguing the SEC, the varying
interpretations of Donaldson must be analyzed, with emphasis on their re-
spective implications for the closely related problem of notice to targets of
SEC investigations. 54
149. 400 U.S. at 530.
150. See Callahan v. First Pa. Bank, 422 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (a taxpayer must
be afforded a hearing to determine whether intervention will be allowed); United States v.
First Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 379 (D. Md. 1975) (taxpayer has a due process right to a
hearing whenever the government seeks his records in connection with an investigation).
151. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (nonadjudicatory fact-finding in-
vestigations do not trigger the full panopoly of due process protections).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (taxpayer had no protectable
fourth amendment interest in bank records since they are the bank's business records);
United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973) (target had no fifth amendment interest
in records which did not belong to him); United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 76-1 U.S.
Tax Cases (CCH) 9295 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (target had no protectable interest in audit-related
records, since it had already voluntarily turned over some of those documents).
153. See United States v. Nemetz, 450 F.2d 924, 926 (3d Cir. 1971) (an order of the
district court granting a taxpayer the right to intervene, though within court's discretion, was
nevertheless improper); United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1971) (per-
missive intervention was not available to a taxpayer whose only interest in the records was
that they related to his tax liability).
154. The notice implications were given significant consideration in cases arising in the
context of IRS investigations before 1976. The courts, however, tended to separate the issues
of notice and intervention. At least three circuits held outright that an investigated taxpayer
had no right to notice of third-party subpoenas, regardless of that individual's ability to
intervene. See United States v. Schutterle, 586 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1978); Scarafiotti v. Shea,
456 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1972); Application of Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965). Another
circuit recognized the same principle in dicta. See United States v. Continental Bank &
Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1974).
In response to these developments, Congress added § 7609 to the Internal Revenue Code
as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. 26 U.S.C. § 7609 (1982). This section affords each
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III. O'BRIEN, PEPSICO AND WEDBUSH: CHOOSING FROM THE
DONALDSON ALTERNATIVES
A. Intervention and Notice
Despite the confusion over Donaldson, the Supreme Court did make one
point clear: the target of an investigation does not have an absolute right
to intervene in a third-party subpoena enforcement proceeding.'55 Rather,
the ability to intervene is conditioned upon the target convincing the court
that a significantly protectable interest is at stake. This is no simple task.
The Donaldson Court provided only two examples of significantly protect-
taxpayer a statutory right to notice whenever the IRS issues a summons to a "third-party
recordkeeper" in connection with an investigation into that taxpayer's tax liability. Con-
gress felt the new measures were necessary to prevent the unreasonable infringement by the
IRS on taxpayers' civil rights, especially the right to privacy. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 368, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3797.
When the IRS issues a summons to a third-party recordkeeper pursuant to an investiga-
tion into a particular taxpayer's tax liability, the taxpayer must receive notice of the sum-
mons from the IRS by registered mail within three days of service, but no later than 23 days
before the day scheduled for the examination of the records. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)(l)(A)(B)
(1982). The taxpayer then has the right to intervene in any proceeding brought to enforce
the summons. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(1) (1982).
Originally, the taxpayer was also afforded the right to stay compliance simply by request-
ing, within 14 days of receiving notice, that the recordkeeper not comply. This provision
was amended in 1982, however, and now, in order to prevent compliance, the taxpayer must
bring a civil action to quash the summons within 20 days of receiving notice. Id
§ 7609(b)(2). The purpose of the change was to make it more difficult to stay compliance. S.
REP. No. 530, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 282, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1028. Under the former provision, the IRS had experienced significant delays in investiga-
tion in a vast number of cases, with no discernable advantages to the taxpayers. The former
provision was so easy to use that taxpayers invoked it even though they had no intention of
intervening. Id
Congress' intent in enacting this legislation was not to expand the substantive rights of
taxpayers. Rather, its purpose was to "facilitate the opportunity of the noticees to raise
defenses which are already available under the law .. " S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 370-71, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3800. Nevertheless, § 7609
provides that the target can assert any challenges available to him under the law, as well as
certain defenses which previously could be asserted only by the subpoenaed party. 26
U.S.C. § 7609 (1982). These include claims that the subpoena is vague or ambiguous, or
that it is not relevant to a lawful investigation. Id In order to discourage the use of the
intervention provisions as a vehicle for delaying an IRS investigation, a section was added
providing that the running of any statute of limitations on the assessment or collection of
taxes, or on any related criminal prosecution, is suspended for as long as any enforcement
proceeding or appeal is pending. Id. § 7609(e).
The list of recordkeepers found in the Act is by no means exhaustive of the possible recip-
ients of third-party summonses. Presumably, whether a taxpayer receives notice of other
third-party summonses depends on whether those third parties inform him voluntarily. Fur-
thermore, assuming notice, the taxpayer's ability to intervene will be governed by Donaldson
and its progeny.
155. 400 U.S. at 530; see supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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able interests, and its definition of "protectable" prevents most personal
interests from attaining that status. 56
Even if a target can overcome this first hurdle, he is not guaranteed the
right to intervene. The ultimate determination is entrusted to the court's
discretion. In essence, the court will balance the target's significantly pro-
tectable interest against the need, recognized by Congress, for prompt, effi-
cient investigation of the securities laws. This "balancing of equities" was
the first alternative suggested by the Donaldson Court.'57
The second alternative suggested by the Donaldson Court requires post-
poning a judicial determination of the status of the target's asserted inter-
est until the investigation is complete and enforcement proceedings are
brought against the target. This alternative is based upon the premise that
a significantly protectable interest, by definition, can be protected ade-
quately at any time. Therefore, since the target's significantly protectable
interest cannot be compromised, the public interest in prompt and efficient
investigation mandates that the interest be protected later, if and when the
matter goes to trial.
Within the context of an SEC investigation, if a court adopts the first
Donaldson alternative without addressing the issue of notice, it has done
nothing to enhance the target's rights. Many of the sources of information
in an SEC investigation are individuals who have little or no interest in an
investigative target's protectable interests. Often, they are vengeful former
or disgruntled employees. A witness may also be a broker who has knowl-
edge of a target's fraudulent acts which have ultimately worked to the dis-
advantage of his other customers. These individuals are unlikely to extend
courtesy notice of their appearances to the subject of the investigation.
Still another source of information may provide statistical or other general
trading information to the SEC, and therefore have no particular interest
in the investigation or the target. Thus, absent a requirement of formal
notice, the right to permissive intervention is highly illusory.
As a practical matter, if a court is to determine the status of a target's
interest in the enforcement of a subpoena, and ultimately balance that in-
terest against the need for effective investigation, every target must be noti-
fied of third-party subpoenas. Even targets with no protectable interest at
stake must be notified, so that they can have a judicial determination that
their interest is, in fact, not significantly protectable. In short, granting the
few individuals who possess a significantly protectable interest the right to
156. See supra notes 141-54 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
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permissive intervention necessarily extends to all targets the right to a judi-
cial determination of the status of their respective rights.
The second Donaldson alternative disposes with the notice problem be-
cause intervention is not available at the subpoena enforcement stage.
Since the target can protect any significantly protectable interest at any
subsequent trial, there is no justification for monitoring the investigation,
or intervening in third-party subpoena enforcement proceedings. There-
fore, the target has no legitimate need for notice of third-party subpoenas.
B. Conflicting Positions
The courts which have addressed the notice issue in the SEC context
have adopted the conflicting positions described above. In Jerry T
O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that a target must be afforded notice of third-party subpoenas
to ensure the SEC's compliance with Powell's requirements. 59 The case
arose out of a formal investigation into possible violations of the 1934 Act,
including insider trading, filing of false or misleading annual reports and
proxy statements, and participating in fraudulent sales of stock.'60 Sub-
poenas were served upon Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., and a number of third
parties. The targets of the investigation brought an action in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington to enjoin the inquiry,
alleging that it was being conducted improperly. The SEC moved to dis-
miss the claim, and the court agreed on the basis that the targets had an
adequate remedy at law in the form of the subpoena enforcement
proceedings. 161
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part. 162 It
affirmed that part of the decision concerning the targets' remedy in con-
nection with the subpoenas issued to them, but reversed with regard to the
subpoenas issued to third parties because, without notice of the subpoenas,
they had no adequate remedy at law. The O'Brien court recognized that a
target of an SEC investigation has a right to be investigated according to
the standards of fairness laid down in Powell. 63 Furthermore, the Powell
prohibition of abuse of process was an interest recognized by the Donald-
158. 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984).
159. 704 F.2d at 1069.
160. Id. at 1066.
161. Jerry T. O'Brien Inc. v. SEC, [1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,442 (E.D. Wash. 1983).
162. 704 F.2d at 1066-69.
163. Id. at 1069.
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son Court as being significantly protectable. 16 Therefore, the O'Brien
court reasoned that every target has an inherent right to permissive inter-
vention. It stated that, as a practical matter, the target must have formal
notice of every third-party subpoena in order to effectively exercise that
right. 1
65
The SEC challenged O'Brien in Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. v. SEC,'
6 6
another case arising within the Ninth Circuit.. Wedbush evolved from an
investigation by the SEC of Webush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., a registered se-
curities brokerage firm with offices in many western cities. The SEC was
investigating possible violations of antifraud and antimanipulation provi-
sions of the 1934 Act by Wedbush and its customers. It subpoenaed a
number of third-party witnesses without notifying the targets and, as a re-
sult, Wedbush brought an action to enjoin the investigation. The Federal
District Court for the Central District of California granted the prelimi-
nary injunction based on O'Brien's establishment of a due process right to
notice of third-party subpoenas for targets of SEC investigations.167 Fur-
thermore, the balance of hardships did not favor the SEC; the public inter-
est favored the injunction. Additionally, in light of the recent O'Brien
decision, the SEC was unlikely to prevail on the merits.'
68
On appeal, the SEC argued that its petition for rehearing in the O'Brien
case had stayed O'Brien's mandate, and therefore it was not good author-
ity in the Wedbush matter. The Ninth Circuit rejected this assertion, stat-
ing that although the O'Brien mandate had not yet issued, it was still final
for stare decisis purposes. 169 The court agreed with the district court that
the SEC did not have a strong likelihood of success on the merits.' 7 °
In PepsiCo, Inc. v. SEC,'7 1 the District Court for the Southern District
of New York completely rejected the O'Brien court's reasoning, and held
that the SEC was not required to notify targets of investigations when it
issued subpoenas to third parties. The case followed an investigation into
alleged accounting fraud in PepsiCo's international division, which was
164. 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971).
165. 704 F.2d at 1069.
166. No. CV-83-3961 (July 11, 1983), appealpending, No. 83-6035 (C.D. Cal.), stay de-
nied, 714 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1983).
167. 714 F.2d at 924.
168. Id
169. Id at 924-25.
170. On Oct. 28, 1983, the Ninth Circuit denied the SEC's petition for a rehearing en
banc of the O'Brien decision. On January 9, 1984, the Supreme Court granted the SEC's
petition for certiorari.
171. 563 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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brought to the SEC's attention by PepsiCo. 72 During the investigation,
PepsiCo filed a complaint seeking an injunction that would have required
the SEC to give PepsiCo notice of all third-party subpoenas issued in con-
nection with the inquiry. PepsiCo also requested a temporary restraining
order barring third-party subpoenas issued without notice, until the court
could evaluate the merits of the injunctive action.'
73
In denying the temporary restraining order, the court stated that a notice
requirement would be abused by investigative targets, and would under-
mine the nation's public policies.' 74 It held that the balance of hardships
tilted so favorably in favor of the SEC that the litigability of the issue may
be irrelevant. 175 The court also noted PepsiCo's ability to vindicate its
rights later if indeed they were violated. 176 With regard to O'Brien, the
PepsiCo court criticized the Ninth Circuit as being unconcerned with the
implications of its decisions.
77
The O'Brien court embraced the first Donaldson alternative and carried
it out to its logical conclusion. The court recognized that every target of an
SEC investigation has a right to be investigated according to the Powell
standards, and also that third parties lack standing to assert the Powell
interests. Furthermore, the O'Brien court acknowledged the status of the
Powell rights as "significantly protectable."1 78 Therefore, every target has
a right to permissive intervention: an opportunity to have the court weigh
the target's Powell rights against the public interest in prompt, efficient
investigation into possible violations of the securities laws. The court ulti-
mately recognized that, given the nature of SEC investigations, absent a
requirement of formal notice, the target's right to permissive intervention
would be unassertable.
179
The O'Brien court analyzed the notice issue in terms of its interpretation
of Donaldson. Requiring the SEC to notify investigative targets every time
it issues a subpoena to a third party was a means to assure the target's right
to permissive intervention. The district court in Wedbush, however, took
the O'Brien decision beyond its "practicality" reasoning. Citing O'Brien, it
held that targets have a due process right to notice of third-party subpoe-
nas.'80 O'Brien, however, contains no reference to due process. Indeed,
172. Id. at 829.
173. Id at 830.
174. Id at 832.
175. Id at 831-32.
176. Id at 831.
177. Id
178. O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1068.
179. Id at 1069.
180. Wedbush, 714 F.2d at 924 (preliminary discussion of decision below).
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the Supreme Court has stated on a number of occasions that the full pano-
poly of due process rights has no place in administrative investigations. 81
Nevertheless, it is clear that O'Brien and Wedbush share an overriding
concern for individual rights. Both decisions allow the target of an SEC
investigation to ensure compliance with the Powell requirements and to
protect any relevant constitutional or common law privileges in a timely
fashion. Furthermore, the decisions assure that a target will be informed
of the nature and scope of the potential charges at an early stage. ' 2 These
are the ultimate benefits of the first Donaldson alternative, and the
mandatory notice requirement that necessarily accompanies it.
The major flaw in the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is that it fails to consider
the drawbacks which accompany a notice requirement in the SEC con-
text. 83 O'Brien and Wedbush are pervaded by the notion that, regardless
of how substantial those drawbacks might be, they are nevertheless
subordinate to the target's individual rights. An additional flaw is the
court's failure to recognize the overwhelming precedent established by
other circuits with regard to notice of IRS summonses. 8 4
The PepsiCo court, in concluding that notice should not be required,
relied heavily on both the drawbacks associated with notice, and on the
wealth of precedent contrary to PepsiCo's position and the O'Brien deci-
sion. "'85 According to the court, the problems which accompany a notice
requirement fall into two categories: the probability of procedural maneu-
vering and other tactics which targets can employ in order to frustrate and
stall an investigation, and the many uncertainties which would be gener-
ated, including the problem of identifying exactly the targets of a particu-
lar investigation.' 86
The PepsiCo court's conclusion that notice should not be required fol-
lows logically from the second Donaldson intervention alternative. The
court, however, did not address notice in terms of Donaldson. Rather, it
attempted to divorce the intervention issue from the notice issue, appar-
ently reading Donaldson as contrary to its ultimate holding.' 87 Neverthe-
less, the court unwittingly applied the analysis suggested by the second
Donaldson alternative when it discussed whether irreparable harm to
181. See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
182. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
183. The O'Brien court stated that notice should be dispensed with only where there are
"special circumstances involving a serious threat to the integrity of the investigation." 704
F.2d at 1069.
184. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
185. 563 F. Supp. at 831-32.
186. Id. at 832.
187. Id at 831.
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PepsiCo would result in the absence of notice. The PepsiCo court rea-
soned that if an attorney-client or work product privilege were violated by
enforcement of the subpoena, PepsiCo could vindicate its rights later in the
enforcement process.' 88 This is essentially the logic of the second Donald-
son alternative.
C Policy Considerations
The negative ramifications which stem from a mandatory notice re-
quirement, along with the ability of a target to protect any legitimate sig-
nificantly protectable interest at a subsequent trial, command that
intervention be disallowed at the subpoena enforcement stage, and that
notice be forsaken in favor of prompt, efficient investigation. As the Pep-
siCo court noted, a mandatory notice requirement would inject substantial
uncertainties into the federal law enforcement process, 89 many of which
could not be resolved without extensive litigation. For instance, at what
point does an individual attain "target" status? Since much of the SEC's
focus at the initial stages of an investigation is on a particular transaction,
and not on an individual, potential targets include anyone associated with,
or with an interest in, that transaction. 9 ° The task of notifying all poten-
tial targets of third-party subpoenas, and then litigating their various inter-
ests in a subpoena enforcement proceeding, would be a monumental one
to say the least. Additionally, a problem would arise if another target were
identified in the middle or toward the conclusion of an investigation. Will
retroactive notice be sufficient to preserve that target's rights under Powell?
If not, can the new target move to exclude any evidence against him which
was obtained prior to his becoming a target?
The PepsiCo court also recognized the probability of abuse inherent in a
mandatory notice requirement. 9 ' Notifying targets of third-party subpoe-
nas will expose SEC investigations to procedural maneuvering and other
tactics designed to obstruct justice, including destruction or alteration of
records, avoidance of service, transfer or dissipation of assets, and intimi-
dation of witnesses.' These and other similar activities are likely to oc-
cur within the context of any law enforcement investigation where the
188. Id.
189. Opposition of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 32-33, PepsiCo, Inc. v.
SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
190. Id. at 32.
191. 563 F. Supp. at 832.
192. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239-42 (1978) (witness
statements in pending unfair labor practice proceedings are exempt from FOIA disclosure in
order to avoid interference with enforcement proceedings in the form of coercion or intimi-
dation of witnesses); United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 961 (11 th Cir. 1983) (secrecy
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subjects of investigation are continually apprised of the government's next
move. The possibility of SEC investigations being thwarted or delayed is
an even more compelling problem in light of budget and enforcement staff
cuts at the SEC.
19 3
The prospect of delay is especially inimical to SEC as opposed to other
agency investigations. 94 All of the securities laws under the SEC's juris-
diction have as their goals investor protection and preservation of market
integrity. 95 Many violations of these laws result in an immediate under-
mining of the SEC's goals. For example, a materially misleading state-
ment in a prospectus has the potential to trigger significant investments of
capital in the issuing company's stock. When an individual trades on in-
side information, he reaps a benefit not at the expense of the government,
but at the expense of other investors. When an individual manipulates the
price of a stock upward and then sells, he is doing so to the detriment of
his buyer. The implications of these fraudulent acts have an immediate
effect on the investors involved. The adverse consequences are not felt
over time; rather, the defrauded investors are immediately left with a sig-
nificant loss of capital and devalued stock.
The benefits of prompt, efficient investigation by the SEC into such vio-
lations are two-fold. First, the staff can prevent the damage which would
otherwise result from securities fraud. Second, timely and effective en-
forcement will discourage similar activities in the future. Ultimately, both
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors are protected from the fraudu-
lent schemes of companies and other investors. Individuals who would
otherwise refrain from investing in securities may be more willing to spec-
ulate, and the economy as a whole will benefit from enhanced efficiency of
capital formation. 96
There are two disadvantages in dispensing with the mandatory notice
requirement. The first is borne exclusively by the target: the inability to
monitor and impede an investigation into his own wrongdoing. Second,
requirement associated with grand-jury proceedings encourages reluctant witnesses to testify
without fear of reprisals from those against whom testimony is given).
193. J. Shad, Address before the Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 21, 1983), reprinted
in THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1983 21, 24 (1983).
194. See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993
(1980) (Supreme Court's dictum in United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978),
that an IRS civil investigation must cease when the case is referred to the Justice Depart-
ment for a parallel criminal investigation, does not apply to SEC investigations, partly be-
cause of the immediacy inherent in an investigation into possible violations of the securities
laws).
195. See supra notes 19-59 and accompanying text.
196. R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 295-300 (1982).
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targets of investigation will be unable to assure SEC compliance with their
Powell rights, or safeguard other assertable interests through the vehicle of
the subpoena enforcement proceeding. This is not to say, however, that
they will never be able to protect their interests. Under the second Donald-
son alternative, those interests can and should be protected at a subsequent
trial,19 7 thereby preserving the integrity of the investigation. Presumably,
there would be some sort of exclusionary mechanism applied to evidence
obtained by the SEC through some forbidden practice, or through an
abuse of the court's process.
98
The application of an exclusionary rule to evidence obtained through
staff abuse of the second Donaldson alternative would inevitably be ac-
companied by the problems traditionally associated with exclusionary
rules.1 99 For example, if the staff obtains information subject to the tar-
get's attorney-client privilege, it is clear that such evidence could be ex-
cluded at the target's trial. But what of evidence obtained as a result of
information subject to the attorney-client privilege, but which does not en-
joy the privilege itself? Would it also be excludable?
Given the presumption of regularity that attaches to administrative ac-
tion,"° in addition to the investigatory freedom which the SEC staff would
enjoy under the second Donaldson alternative, any exclusionary principle
would have to be applied strictly by courts. Such an application would be
necessary in order to achieve some degree of fairness to investigative
targets. Furthermore, a strictly applied exclusionary rule would motivate
the staff to stay within the bounds of its already broad investigatory
powers.
The possibility of harm traceable to investigations with no legitimate
purpose and which are never brought to trial, thereby denying the target of
a remedy, is remote. In most instances, the purpose would be harassment
197. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 531.
198. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
199. The exclusionary rule has been justified by the Supreme Court on two grounds.
The first is the need to deter law enforcement officers from using illegal and unconstitutional
procedures in the search for evidence. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48
(1975); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). The second reason for invoking
the exclusionary rule is to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 392-93 (1914). Both goals would be furthered in the SEC enforcement setting if
the rule were applied strictly. See generally Comment, Aiw Due Process Exclusionary Rule:
A Fifth Amendment Due Process Approach to the Regulation of Government Misconduct, 17
U.S.F.L. REV. 277 (1983).
200. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. at 442-44.
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or duress 20 1 and, therefore, the target would have full knowledge of the
investigation, and could bring suit to enjoin it.
Public interest in prompt, efficient investigation into possible violations
of the securities laws is overwhelming. Nevertheless, respect for the rights
of individuals has been, and continues to be, the bulwark of American
society. When there is a conffict between public and individual interests, it
should be resolved through a balancing and compromise which will result
in the fewest restrictions on the operation of each interest.
20 2
If the Ninth Circuit's notice requirement were to become the law in all
circuits, the individual rights of targets would be safeguarded at an early
stage, and the enforcement staff would be prevented from abusing its in-
vestigative authority. On the other hand, targets would be given the ability
to impede and deter investigations into their own wrongdoing, greatly re-
ducing the power of the SEC to enforce the securities laws. In turn, inves-
tors would be much more vulnerable to fraud, and the integrity of the
financial markets would be reduced. Such an undermining could ulti-
mately affect the ability of publicly held corporations to raise funds
through stock offerings. That, in turn, would have far reaching ramifica-
tions for the nation's economy.
Alternatively, rejection of the notice requirement would preserve the in-
tegrity of the financial markets by protecting investors through powerful
enforcement authority. Furthermore, the identity of third-party witnesses
could be kept confidential, and courts would not need to grapple with the
problem of defining a "target" in SEC investigations. On the other hand,
investigative targets would be unable to challenge a subpoena until trial.
This could lead to staff abuse of investigative authority, resulting in a great
disadvantage to the target. With the strict application of an exclusionary
rule, however, such abuse could be minimized.
Given the equities and interests involved, requiring the SEC to give real
and potential targets notice of third-party subpoenas will not achieve the
least restrictive end.20 3 Rather, this end will be achieved by dispensing
with a notice requirement, and allowing targets to assert their significantly
protectable interests only after the investigation has been concluded. A
strict exclusionary rule may then be applied to evidence obtained through
a violation of those interests.
201. See, e.g., Ayers v. SEC, 482 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. Mont. 1980); see also supra notes
113-14 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 517; PepsiCo, 563 F. Supp. at 828.
203. O'Brien has had a devastating effect on the SEC's west coast investigations. Ac-
cording to the Wall Street Journal, the SEC has chosen to freeze its West Coast investiga-
tions, rather than afford notice to targets. Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1983, at 33, col. 4.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Donaldson provides two possible approaches in deciding the issue of
whether to allow a target of investigation to intervene in a third-party sub-
poena enforcement proceeding. First, the court can evaluate the target's
asserted interest in order to determine whether it is significantly protect-
able. If it is, the court can then balance that interest with the SEC's need
for prompt investigation, finally deciding whether intervention should be
allowed. As the O'Brien court held, for this approach to have any mean-
ing, the target must have notice of third-party subpoenas. The second
Donaldson approach disallows intervention at the early stages of investiga-
tion since the target's interests can be adequately protected at a subsequent
trial, if and when it occurs. Since there is no right to even permissive inter-
vention, there is no need for targets to be notified of third-party subpoenas.
The devastating effects which mandatory notice would have on SEC in-
vestigations require adoption of the second Donaldson alternative. The
SEC is charged with the responsibility of protecting investors and preserv-
ing the integrity of the financial markets. These interests are severely and
irretrievably undermined by unchecked fraud in the trading of securities.
Therefore, it is imperative that the SEC be able to investigate promptly
and efficiently, unburdened by procedural challenges and other less whole-
some tactics which a notice requirement would encourage. The result will
be effective enforcement of the securities laws, and preservation of the le-
gitimate rights of investigated parties.
Brian T Corbett
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